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A TRIAL JUDGE'S RUMINATIONS ON THE REPORTER'S
PRIVILEGE
Susan Webber Wright*
I once heard an experienced judge tell a group of lawyers something to
this effect: "If anyone is going to jail, make sure it is your client, not you."
In recent months the press has focused on the matter of a reporter's
privilege or a reporter's qualified privilege to refuse to give testimony in
court,' and reporters have gone to jail for refusal to testify. Even though this
is not a new issue, it has gained prominence lately because of recent well-
publicized events that include a federal grand jury indictment of an aide to
the Vice President of the United States and a reporter's refusal to testify or
hand over her notes. Congress is considering enacting a law that would insu-
late news reporters from compelled testimony,2 and a number of state legis-
latures have enacted similar laws.3
From the perspective of a trial court judge, I will take a look at the re-
porter's privilege or qualified privilege by comparing it with other privileges
established by common law or legislative enactment. I will focus on what
interest or interests testimonial privileges protect and on limitations courts
have placed on such privileges. Next I will examine the principles recited in
Branzburg v. Hayes4 and the First Amendment interests that reporters have
sought to protect in decisions issued after Branzburg, many of which recog-
nize what is called a "qualified privilege." Finally, I conclude that any tes-
timonial privilege extended to news reporters should be statutory and should
be limited to civil cases for the protection of confidential sources who are
not revealing confidential information in violation of law or court order.
* United States District Judge, Eastern District of Arkansas. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research and editorial assistance of Lucille DeGostin, Barry Ward, and Jo-
Jo Baldwin.
1. The issue of protecting confidential sources dates at least to colonial times. See Kara
A. Larsen, Note, The Demise of the First Amendment-Based Reporter's Privilege: Why This
Current Trend Should Not Surprise the Media, 37 CONN. L. REv. 1235, 1238 (2005).
2. See Free Flow of Information Act, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
3. See Jeffrey S. Nestler, Note, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme
Court Recognition of the Journalist's Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 201, 225 n. 120 (2005)
(listing thirty-two state reporter's privilege statutes).
4. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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I. PRIVILEGES AS EXCLUSIONARY RULES OF EVIDENCE
I believe that judges are acutely aware that privileges keep evidence
from the finder of fact. The evidence excluded by privilege might be very
trustworthy and highly relevant. Privileges "are in derogation of the search
for the truth."5 Almost all other rules that exclude evidence do so because
the evidence is either irrelevant or untrustworthy. 6 The most obvious exam-
ples of such rules are the rules excluding hearsay because hearsay by defini-
tion is untrustworthy and cannot be cross-examined. But, privileges protect
interests that are so important that they outweigh the public's interest in
having all available relevant and trustworthy evidence before the finder of
fact.
In the area of reporter's qualified privileges, commentators often dis-
cuss a "balancing" of interests to determine the extent of the reporter's
qualified privilege. Needless to say, much of the case law on a reporter's
qualified testimonial privilege discusses weighing one interest against an-
other, such as freedom of the press against the need for a reporter's testi-
mony. The balancing is really the reason that the privilege is said to be
"qualified." I submit that the traditional laws governing privileges are based
on a type of balancing test that has already been done for persons in certain
relationships and that is ordinarily not done on a case-by-case basis: the
ability to learn the truth is outweighed by another interest, which is the pres-
ervation of a confidential relationship.
As a federal judge, I have had occasion to apply both federal and state
law to questions of privilege. To a large extent, exclusionary rules of evi-
dence that developed at common law have been codified in one form or an-
other. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs a federal court's
application of privilege. It does not refer to specific privileges, but states the
following:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, gov-
ernment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a wit-
5. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that the public has a right
to "every man's evidence" and that exceptions are not lightly created or expansively con-
strued).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401-15, 801-07. However, in criminal cases the "Exclusion-
ary Rule" keeps out what is likely very trustworthy evidence on grounds that it was unlaw-
fully obtained. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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ness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.7
Congress specifically chose this rule over a rule that enumerated cer-
tain privileges founded in common law and in the Constitution.! A reporter's
privilege was not among them.9 However, the reference to application of
state law would apply not only in diversity cases, but also in cases "to which
State law supplies the rule of decision."' The comments to this rule make it
clear that federal courts will frequently be required to look at two bodies of
law on issues of privilege."l
The State of Arkansas has adopted what are essentially the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, and there are specific provisions governing areas of
privilege, most of which had their genesis in the common law.'" There is no
specific provision governing a reporter's privilege. However, as you proba-
bly know by now, the Arkansas legislature some years ago passed what
might be called a privilege law for reporters. It reads as follows:
Before any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper, periodical
or radio station, or publisher of any newspaper or periodical, or manager
or owner of any radio station shall be required to disclose to any grand
jury or other authority the source of information used as the basis for any
article he or she may have written, published, or broadcast, it must be
shown that the article was written, published, or broadcast in bad faith,
with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare.1
3
This statute does not apply to federal grand jury subpoenas. 4 There
remain interesting questions concerning this statute. One is whether it would
apply to information obtained in confidence but never published, written, or
7. FED. R. EvID. 501.
8. In 1972, the Chief Justice for the United States Supreme Court sent Congress pro-
posed rules of evidence formulated by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence and approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States and by the
Supreme Court. The proposed rules contained nine rules governing specific privileges, all of
which had existed at common law. See RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES (Proposed Draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61 (1972) [hereinafter Proposed Rules];
see also FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note (detailing history of Article V of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
9. The specific privileges included in the proposed rules were privileges for required
reports, communications between lawyer and client, communications between psychothera-
pist and patient, spousal testimony, communications to clergymen, political vote, trade se-
crets, secrets of state, and identity of an informer. See Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. at 230-61.
10. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note.
11. See id.
12. See ARKR. EvID. 501-12.
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (LEXIS 2005).
14. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Am. Broad. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
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broadcast. Another question is whether it would apply to a newsman who is
a personal witness to a crime, when that newsman has promised whoever
gave him access to the crime that his identity would remain confidential. For
example, in Branzburg, discussed below, the reporter had promised to keep
confidential the identity of those he observed violating the law.'5 The lower
court, in interpreting a state reporter's shield statute, found that the statute
did not shield a reporter who had personally witnessed alleged criminal ac-
tivity.' 6 I mention this statute only to acknowledge that Arkansas, along with
many other states, has extended statutory protection to certain persons in the
media.
II. COMMON-LAW AND STATUTORY PRIVILEGES AND THE QUESTION OF A
COMMON LAW REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
A brief examination of the marital, priest-penitent, lawyer-client, and
doctor-patient privileges is helpful in defining the policies they protect. The
historical development of these privileges is complex, but they all arguably
stem from "a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain
narrowly prescribed relationships, from the states' coercive or supervisory
powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping."17 In other words, these
privileges protect the "free flow of information" between those in certain
relationships.
Wigmore, perhaps the foremost authority on the rules of evidence, has
outlined situations in which a testimonial privilege should apply:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3)
The relation must be one [that] in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.'
8
15. 408 U.S. 665, 667-71 (1972).
16. See Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) rev'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
17. Walter J. Walsh, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: An Hibernocentric Essay in Post-
Colonial Jurisprudence, 80 IND. L.J. 1037, 1039 (2005) (citing David W. Louisell, Confiden-
tiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101,
110-11 (1956)).
18. Anthony L. Fargo, Reconsidering the Federal Journalist's Privilege for Non-
Confidential Information: Gonzales v. NBC, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J., 355, 362 (2001)




For the most part, the jurisprudence on testimonial privileges other than
a reporter's privilege respects the limitations endorsed by Wigmore. For
example, the traditional marital privilege is limited to confidential commu-
nications between spouses. 9 I emphasize the word "confidential." The privi-
lege may be asserted, in a criminal proceeding, by either the accused or the
spouse of the accused.20 It meets the Wignore requirements in that (1) it
originates in confidence; (2) the element of confidentiality is essential to the
satisfactory maintenance of the marriage; (3) the marriage relationship is
one sedulously fostered by the community; and (4) the common law has
established that the injury to the marriage relationship would be greater than
the benefits that would inure to our system of justice were the privilege not
honored.
In some jurisdictions, the marital privilegp cap extend beyond confi-
dential communications between spouses. In Trbrpmel v. United States,2' the
United States Supreme Court recognized a broader spousal testimonial privi-
lege, the "adverse spousal testimonial privilege," which permits a spouse to
refuse to testify against the other spouse and is not confined to confidential
communications but extends to conversations or actions with other parties.22
The privilege belongs to the witness-spouse. 23 The policy supporting the
privilege is the prospective preservation of the marriage in question. 4 In
other words, if the testimony would jeopardize the future relationship of the
parties, the Court should enforce the privilege. In Trammel, the Supreme
Court looked at the particular marriage in question and determined that there
was little to be salvaged, as the wife willingly testified against her hus-
band.25 The Court reasoned that vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse
promoted the policy of protecting the marriage on a going-forward basis.26
19. See ARK. R. EviD. 504.
20. Id.
21. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
22. See id. at 51 ("The... privilege is invoked, not to exclude private marital communi-
cations, but rather to exclude evidence of criminal acts and of communications made in the
presence of third persons."); see also Katherine 0. Eldred, "Every Spouse's Evidence":
Availability of the Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege in Federal Civil Trials, 69 U. CMI.
L. REV. 1319, 1321 (2002) (discussing the adverse spousal testimonial privilege as modified
in Trammel).
23. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
24. See id. (explaining that vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse furthers the goal
of preserving marital harmony).
25. Id. at 52 ("When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal pro-
ceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is
probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.").
26. Eldred, supra note 22, at 1323 (explaining that, under Trammel, the policy justifying
the adverse spousal testimonial privilege focuses on whether compelled testimony will harm
the marriage on a "going-forward basis, regardless of whether the testimonial information
was received in confidence").
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The Trammel case shows that the policy supporting a spousal testimonial
privilege is to protect the specific marriage, and it does not apply across the
board.
Courts have refused to apply both the confidential communication
privilege and the adverse spousal testimonial privilege in cases involving
crimes against a spouse and crimes against children.27 In Arkansas, there is
also no privilege when a spouse is charged with a crime against "a person
residing in the household of either [spouse], or... a third person committed
in the course of committing a crime against any of them.,
2
1
The attorney-client privilege is the privilege most familiar to those in
the legal profession. It protects communications between the parties that
take place for the sake of legal advice. It is waived, sometimes without in-
tent, when the communication is made in the presence of a third party.29
More importantly, it does not apply when the communication reveals to the
attorney the fact that the client seeks legal advice in aid of a crime or fraud.3"
The privilege belongs to the client and may be waived by the client. 3' At the
risk of sounding redundant, I submit that the nature of the lawyer-client rela-
tionship is such that the Wigmore factors support the privilege, as Wignore
himself concluded.32
The clergy or priest-penitent privilege, called a "religious privilege" in
Arkansas, is another privilege that covers confidential communications. The
communication must be made to the "clergyman in his professional charac-
ter as spiritual adviser."33 Justifications for it are similar to those protecting
the confidential communications between spouses and between lawyer and
client: the privilege protects the free flow of information and meets the par-
ties' expectations of privacy and confidentiality. 34 However, some authori-
ties have found this privilege to be grounded in the free exercise of relig-
ion,35 which would make it a constitutional privilege.
27. See id. at 1322.
28. ARK. R. EVID. 504(d).
29. See, e.g., Shankle v. State, 309 Ark. 40, 47-48, 827 S.W.2d 642, 645-46 (1992).
30. ARK. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
31. See, e.g., Poyner v. State, 288 Ark. 402, 406, 705 S.W.2d 882, 885 (1986).
32. See Fargo, supra note 18, at 361.
33. ARK. R. EVID. 505(b).
34. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The priest-penitent privilege
recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confi-
dence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and
guidance in return.").
35. See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concur-
ring) ("[S]ound policy-reason and experience--concedes to religious liberty a rule of evi-
dence that a clergyman shall not disclose on a trial the secrets of a penitent's confidential
confession .... "); see also Taylor L. Anderson, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: A Mormon
Perspective, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 55, 62 (2004) (discussing free exercise of religion as a ration-
ale for the priest-penitent privilege).
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The traditional physician-patient privilege applies to confidential
communications relating to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.3 6 The
privilege does not apply in proceedings to determine whether the patient
should be hospitalized for a mental illness, and it does not apply when a
court orders the examination.3 7 The privilege applies to medical records, as
well as to confidential communications," and belongs to the patient.
39
All of the aforementioned privileges protect a confidential relationship
with very specific limitations. These privileges operate to protect the rela-
tionship and to encourage communication. It is clear that our society places
such a high value on these confidential relationships that we are willing to
forego truthful, relevant testimony in a court of law in order to preserve the
relationship. One aspect of all of these relationships is that the parties to
them are known to the court and to the party seeking the testimony. It is
ordinarily possible for a judicial officer to hear, in camera, the substance of
the communication to determine whether it is in fact subject to the privilege.
For example, on rare occasion, I have actually heard the content of such
communications so that I could rule on their admissibility over a claim of
privilege. The rules of evidence and precedent from both federal and state
courts provide very helpful guidance.
Any reporter's common-law privilege might differ from the aforemen-
tioned common-law privileges in several respects. First, if a reporter has a
privilege to refrain from testifying concerning the identity of a confidential
source, the finder of fact does not know the source or its reliability, and the
information itself might have been published far and wide. In other words,
the substance of the communication might be known, but the source remains
a secret. With traditional privileges, the substance remains secret, but the
source of the communication is known.
Second, to a large extent, the common-law privileges do not exclude
testimony about ongoing or future criminal activity, but sometimes reporters
argue that their privilege should extend to just that. In fact, sometimes the
very communication is itself a crime or a violation of a court order, yet a
reporter might claim the privilege.4 °
Third, common-law privileges may be waived by the party who is re-
ceiving the benefit of the confidential communication. For example, the
client may waive the attorney-client privilege, and the penitent may waive
the priest-penitent privilege. But, sometimes reporters claim that the power
to waive is the reporters', even when their "confidential" sources have
36. ARK. R. EVID. at 503(a)(4).
37. Id. at 503(d)(i)-(2).
38. Id. at 503(b).
39. Id. at 503(c).
40. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir.
2005); see also In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2004).
2006]
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agreed to release them from any confidentiality agreement. Fourth, com-
mon-law privileges are limited to confidential communications, while the
reporter's privilege has been applied to non-confidential communications.
Therefore, I conclude that any reporter's privilege is so different from
the privileges recognized at common law that there really should be no re-
porter's privilege at common law.4
III. THE QUESTION OF A FIRST AMENDMENT REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
It is often said that reporters are the fourth estate in our system of gov-
ernment because they are the watch dog for the other branches. They help
keep the rest of us clean and honest. It is rare that secrecy in government can
be condoned, and no one can seriously deny that freedom of the press is one
of the bulwarks of our democracy. Similarly, it is clear that policies that
protect the free flow of information to the press are necessary. Without a
free press, our political parties, our public institutions, and our private lives
would not be the same. It is so much a part of our culture that we reacted
with shock when political cartoons mocking Muslims caused riots in other
parts of the world.43
I have read that more and more reporters are the subject of subpoenas
to reveal information they have gathered in performing their jobs. 4 Report-
ers have sought protection from testifying, asserting the important roles they
play in our system of government and arguing that the First Amendment
requires that they be allowed unfettered access to gather information. It is
helpful to take a closer look at some of the cases.
In Branzburg v. Hayes,45 the United States Supreme Court considered
reporters' claims of privilege in three cases.46 In all three, the reporters were
41. In the recent high-profile grand jury investigation into alleged leaks by government
officials regarding the identity of CIA agent Valarie Plame, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia affirmed contempt citations against journalists and a pub-
lisher who refused to disclose their confidential sources, claiming right to a reporter's privi-
lege. See In re Miller, 438 F.3d at 1143. All members of the three-judge panel agreed that if a
federal, common-law reporter's privilege existed, it had been overcome under the facts of the
case. Id. at 1141. However, Judges Sentelle and Tatel filed separate, concurring opinions that
highlight the issues and arguments surrounding the question of a federal, common-law re-
porter's privilege. Id. at 1153-83.
42. See generally Heather Stamp, Note and Comment, McKevitt v. Pallasch: How the
Ghosts of the Branzburg Decision Are Haunting Journalists in the Seventh Circuit, DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 363 (2004) (discussing the special role of the press in Ameri-
can society).
43. Jeffrey Stinson & Rick Hampson, Cartoon Crisis Frames Europe's Conflict Within,
USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2006, at IA.
44. See generally Wendy N. Davis, The Squeeze on the Press, 91 A.B.A.J. 22 (2005).
45. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
46. Id. at 667-79.
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investigating criminal activities, and they were subpoenaed to testify before
grand juries.47 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the report-
ers could refuse to testify on First Amendment grounds, as they argued that
their compelled testimony would inhibit their access to the free flow of in-
formation.48 In all three cases, the reporter had knowledge, obtained on a
promise of confidentiality, of suspected criminal activity.4 9 The Court, in a
five-four decision written by Justice White, ruled that reporters do not enjoy
any special privileges over those of average citizens and that grand juries are
entitled to a reporter's testimony."0 In a footnote, Justice White, writing for
the majority, emphasized the value placed on the right of the grand jury to
"every man's evidence" with a quote from Jeremy Bentham, which also
addressed the newsmen's arguments that the grand jury subpoena constitutes
an undue burden:
Are men of the first rank and consideration-are men high in office-
men whose time is not less valuable to the public than to themselves-
are such men to be forced to quit their business, their functions, and what
is more than all, their pleasure, at the beck of every idle or malicious ad-
versary, to dance attendance upon every petty cause? Yes, as far as it is
necessary, they and everybody. . . . Were the Prince of Wales, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing
by in the same coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman
were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-
sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon them for
their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly.5 '
The opinion points out that "it is obvious that agreements to conceal in-
formation relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend
them from the standpoint of public policy" 2 and that those who fail to report
a crime can be guilty of misprision.5 3 Justice White wrote the following:
"We cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects
a newsman's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or
evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to
do something about it."'5 4 Justice White noted the difficulties of expanding
the First Amendment by extending a constitutional testimonial privilege to
47. Id. at 667, 672, 675.
48. Id. at 679-81.
49. Id. at 667-71, 672-79.
50. Id. at 702.
51. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 n.26 (quoting 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320-
21 (J. Bowring ed. 1843)).
52. Id. at 696.
53. Id.




newsmen, explaining that the "traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is
the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeo-
graph[,] just as much as of the large[,] metropolitan publisher who utilizes
the latest photocomposition methods.",55 Despite its ruling, the majority left
open the possibility of First Amendment infringement for "grand jury inves-
tigations ... instituted or conducted other than in good faith."56 The Court
stated that "[o]fficial harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of
law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news
sources would have no justification.""7
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, reiterated that the government
may not use grand jury subpoenas to harass reporters.5" He wrote that the
issue of whether a court should quash a grand jury subpoena to a reporter
should be decided by balancing the "freedom of the press and the obligation
of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct."'59
Justice Stewart wrote a dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall joined.' Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent.6 Justice Stewart
wrote that the majority was inviting "state and federal authorities to under-
mine the historic independence of the press by attempting to annex the jour-
nalistic profession as an investigative arm of government."62 He also rea-
soned that the right to keep a source confidential is "bottomed on the consti-
tutional guarantee of a full flow of information to the public"63 and that "[a]
corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news."64 He also
advocated a balancing test to determine whether a reporter should testify:
Governmental officials must... demonstrate that the information sought
is clearly relevant to a precisely defined subject of governmental inquiry.
They must demonstrate that it is reasonable to think the witness in ques-
tion has that information. And they must show that there is not any
55. Id. at 704. I cannot resist mentioning that in 1970 the Supreme Court, along with the
rest of us, could not have predicted the use of the intemet and blogs as a means of exercising
fundamental, individual First Amendment rights.
56. Id. at 707-08.
57. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08.
58. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548-
51 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (indicating that compelling a journalist
to reveal a confidential news source would violate the First Amendment if the source's iden-
tity was not relevant and material and not sought in good faith).
59. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 725.
61. Id. at711.
62. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 726 n.2.
64. Id. at 727.
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means of obtaining the information less destructive of First Amendment
liberties.
65
As most of you probably know by now, the development of the law fol-
lowing Branzburg has been confusing. Because the Branzburg majority was
writing specifically about reporters who had been subpoenaed by grand ju-
ries, it is understandable that some courts would take the position that
Branzburg arguably leaves open the question of whether reporters enjoy a
qualified testimonial privilege outside a grand jury. There is little doubt that
Justice Powell's concurring opinion influenced many courts to hold that the
press enjoys a qualified testimonial privilege based on the First Amendment.
I do not believe that it would be productive to give a digest of all of the
cases, but I can safely conclude that most circuits have recognized some sort
of constitutionally based, qualified privilege for reporters, although there is
absolutely no uniformity with respect to several factors, including (1)
whether a qualified privilege applies in both civil and criminal cases,' (2)
whether the privilege should apply only to confidential information or to
non-confidential information as well,67 and (3) how to "balance" the inter-
ests at stake.6" I did find two recent law review articles that helpfully digest
the cases, 69 and a 2003 judicial opinion that does the same.7"
I will give a couple of examples concerning how courts have applied
Branzburg. The District of Columbia Circuit, as you undoubtedly know,
applied the rule in Branzburg to the grand jury subpoena received by Judith
Miller, who possessed information she claimed to be confidential. 7' But, this
court took an entirely different approach in a civil case in which Wen Ho
65. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 740 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
66. See Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (limiting Branzburg to
criminal cases involving grand jury subpoenas and finding a qualified First Amendment
reporter's privilege available in civil cases); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that Branzburg provides a qualified reporter's privilege that applies in crimi-
nal and civil proceedings); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that the reporter's privilege applies only when the individual claiming the privilege ac-
quires confidential information with the intent to disseminate the information to the public).
67. See Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
qualified reporter's privilege applies to non-confidential as well as confidential information,
but the test for overcoming the privilege for non-confidential information is less demanding);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (holding that the privilege
shields a reporter's non-confidential resource materials, as well as the identity of confidential
informants).
68. See Larsen, supra note 1, at 1246-47.
69. See generally Fargo, supra note 18; Larsen, supra note 1.
70. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).




Lee complained that a government informer had leaked personal informa-
tion about Lee and his wife to a reporter.
Following earlier precedent,73 the District of Columbia Circuit in Lee v.
Department of Justice74 applied a two-part balancing test: (1) the testimony
sought must go to the "heart of the matter and must not be merely margin-
ally relevant" and (2) the party seeking the testimony "must have exhausted
'every reasonable alternative source of information' so that journalists are
not simply a default source of information for plaintiffs. 75 The court deter-
mined that there was no privilege, pointing out that "the protections of the
Privacy Act do not disappear when the illegally disclosed information is
leaked to a journalist, no matter how newsworthy the government official
may feel the information is.
76
The Fourth Circuit provides a more interesting case study of the re-
porter's qualified privilege. In two cases, United States v. Steelhammer
(Steelhammer )77 and In re Shain,78 the court's opinions seem to conclude
that there is no privilege absent a showing of confidentiality, harassment of
reporters, or bad faith on the part of the government. 79 But, in the 1993 case
of Church of Scientology International v. Daniels," the Fourth Circuit rec-
ognized a privilege for subpoenaed materials relating to an editorial board
meeting of USA Today in a libel suit.81 Assuming, without discussion, that
the materials were privileged, the court concluded that the appellant failed to
show that the lower court abused its discretion in denying these materials,
and it cited earlier authority adopting a test that considered the following
factors: whether the information sought is relevant, whether it can be ob-
tained by other means, and whether there is a compelling interest in the in-
72. See Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
73. See id. at 58-59 (applying Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Carey v.
Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
74. 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
75. 1d. at 57 (citing Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713).
76. Id. at 60.
77. 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976), aft'don reh 'g, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977).
78. 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992).
79. See id. at 853 ("We conclude, therefore, that the absence of confidentiality or vindic-
tiveness in the facts of this case fatally undermines the reporters' claim to a First Amendment
privilege."). In Steelhammer 1, 539 F.2d at 376-78, Judge Winter filed a dissenting opinion
that was subsequently adopted by the court sitting en banc. See United States v. Steelhammer
(Steelhammer I1), 561 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1977). Judge Winter observed that the reporters
invoking the reporter's privilege had not acquired the information at issue on a confidential
basis, and they were not subpoenaed in an effort to harass them or to embarrass their news-
gathering abilities. Steelhammer 1, 539 F.2d at 376.
80. 992 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 869 (1993).
81. Id. at 1335.
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formation.82 The court pointed out that the defendant admitted to making the
offending statement exactly as it had been quoted, so the plaintiff did not
really need the information sought, 3 and the court affirmed the lower
court's determination that summary judgment was appropriate for the appel-
lant's failure to present evidence of malice. 4
In 2003, a Seventh Circuit opinion in McKevitt v. Pallasch, 5 written by
Judge Posner, upset those who advocate a reporter's privilege. 86 Judge Pos-
ner criticized much of the post-Branzburg jurisprudence and asserted that
Branzburg leaves no room for a reporter's privilege. 7 Posner correctly ob-
served that "[t]he cases that extend the privilege to nonconfidential sources
express concern with harassment, burden, using the press as an investigative
arm of government, and so forth., 88 He concluded that "[s]ince these con-
siderations were rejected by Branzburg even in the context of a confidential
source, these courts may be skating on thin ice." 89 Even though Judge Pos-
ner offered up all this criticism, he went on to find that the witness who
sought to quash the subpoena in question was attempting to protect his own
intellectual property interests and was improperly invoking the First Amend-
ment.90
There are other interesting cases from other circuits that I could include
here. But, I believe that I have given a sample of the various approaches
taken to the matter of a reporter's qualified privilege. As a trial judge, I feel
safe in following Branzburg in the case of a grand jury subpoena to a re-
porter, unless it is for purposes of harassment or otherwise in bad faith. But I
am unsure concerning the law of a qualified privilege for reporters in civil
cases. I question the wisdom of applying a constitutionally based, qualified
privilege that is as fluid as this one appears to be. Even though the
Branzburg majority acknowledged that "news gathering is not without its
First Amendment protections,"9' I am at a loss concerning the extent of
those protections into matters of testimonial privilege beyond the Branzburg
holding. Furthermore, the First Amendment applies to each and every one of
82. Id. The balancing factors considered in Church of Scientology International are
those recommended in Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
83. Church of Scientology Int'l, 992 F.2d at 1335.
84. Id.
85. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
86. See Larsen, supra note 1, at 1254.
87. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
88. Id. at 533 (citing Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Cuthbertson,
630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980)).
89. Id
90. Id. at 534.
91. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
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us, and I find it difficult to take an individual right and apply it more favora-
bly to one group, that is, reporters, over another, not to mention the diffi-
culty in determining, with benefit of a statute, just who is in this special "re-
porter class. 92
Because privileges are in derogation of the truth, prudence and prece-
dent require that a court decide cases on grounds other than the Constitution
when possible.93 I would try to decide the issue of whether to quash a re-
porter's subpoena on grounds other than a questionable constitutional privi-
lege. In an Eighth Circuit libel case, the court found it unnecessary to decide
the issue of a reporter's privilege because the reporter's testimony concern-
ing his confidential sources was unnecessary to decide the case, as the court
concluded that there was no malice as a matter of law and affirmed sum-
mary judgment for the defendant.94 Another example is the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Church of Scientology International v. Daniels,95 in which the
court acknowledged that the information sought was privileged and then
applied a balancing test in which the privilege prevailed.96 The court might
have been able to reach the same result without deciding the issue because
in that case, too, the court affirmed summary judgment on the ground that
there was no malice.97 Another possibility: Could the court have reached the
same result by quashing the subpoena pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure? I cannot answer this, but subsection (c)(3)(A)(iv)
allows a court to quash a subpoena that "subjects a person to undue burden."
I concede that a subpoena burdens just about anyone who is served one. But,
many of the factors reporters argue concerning the First Amendment in re-
gard to subpoenas sound like "burdens" that might be recognized under this
rule. Furthermore, subsection (c)(3)(B) allows a court to modify or quash a
subpoena if it "requires disclosure of a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information, or ... requires disclo-
sure of an unretained expert's opinion or information not describing specific
events or occurrences in dispute and resulting from the expert's study made
not at the request of any party."98 It is conceivable that non-party reporters,
at times, could try to use these rules and others to modify or quash at least
some subpoenas. Keep in mind that federal judges have discretion under the
rules of evidence with respect to the evidence.
92. See Larsen, supra note 1, at 1247 n.107 (listing cases extending the privilege to
others such as book authors and filmmakers).
93. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Sentelle, J., concurring).
94. See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
95. 992 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1993).
96. Id. at 1335.
97. Id.




Public policy is most clearly enunciated by Congress, and if it is the
will of the public that members of the press be shielded from testifying,
Congress should pass a law so stating. I believe that such a law should pro-
tect reporters in civil cases from revealing confidential information, as long
as that information is not essential to the resolution of the case and as long
as the communication of such confidential information was not itself a vio-
lation of law or court order. There may even be situations in which a law is
consistent with keeping information confidential. For example, surely it
would be against public policy to reveal the confidences of whistleblowers,
solely for the sake of exposure, when we have laws enacted for the purpose
of protecting whistleblowers.
However, I do not believe that any statutory reporter's privilege should
be used to defeat other interests that are important to our constitutional form
of government. It is true that freedom of the press is essential to our form of
government. But, equally essential are the constitutional rights to indictment
by a grand jury and a fair trial, in both criminal and civil cases.
I know that we lawyers have trouble with our public image because we
have had a few scoundrels and crooks among our ranks, and their bad image
has tarnished all of us. Similarly, the press has been tarnished by a few bad
reporters, including those who have quoted confidential sources who are not
telling the truth, or even non-existent, "confidential" sources. Some mem-
bers of the public also believe that news is slanted, and that the news media
are really not interested in the truth. If journalists want the citizens of the
United States to shield members of the media from testifying, journalists
should keep in mind the following from the Code of Ethics of the United
States Society of Professional Journalists: "We believe in public enlighten-
ment as the forerunner of justice and in our constitutional role to seek the
truth as part of the public's right to know the truth."99
Courts and grand juries also seek the truth. And, a testimonial privi-
lege, once again, is in derogation of the truth.
99. The (United States) Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, available at
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/-jour/documents/ethics5.html.
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